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ATTORNEY AND CLzNT-D)SBARIE"r FOP NoX-PnorxssIoN MSCO:N-
DUCT-A petition was granted for the disbarment of the defendant, an at-
torney, -who had been convicted for receiving stolen goods as a pawnbroker.
Held, on appeal, that the defendant be disbarred for misconduct. Petition
of Law Ass'n of Philadelphia, 135 Atl. 732 (Pa. 1927).
Generally there will be no disbarment for private vice indulged in out-
side the profession. Ez Parte Stratford, 12 L. J. Q. B. (N. s.) 331 (1843)
(gambling); see In re Washington, 82 Kan. 829, 834, 109 Pac. 700, 703
(1910) (exhibition of violent temper and abusive language); Black V.
Smith, 290 11. 241, 242, 124 N. E. 807, 808 (1919) ; (1919) 9 A. L. R. 183,
note (carrying a pistol and frequenting a disorderly house). Contra: Inwr
Marsh, 42 Utah, 186, 129 Pac. 411 (1913) (keeping disorderly house and
selling opium); cf. In re Maccy, 109 Kan. 1, 196 Pac. 1095 (1921) (drunk
at trial). But public misconduct in affairs outside the profession is often
a ground for disbarment. Ex. parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct. G09
(1882) (participation in lynching); State s rtel. McLaughlin v. Graves,
73 Or. 331, 144 Pac. 484 (1914) (participation in unlawful assembly and
jailbreak); In 'l Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 Atl. 473 (1921) (disloyalty in
-war-time); In r'e Callicotte, 57 Mont. 297, 187 Pac. 1019 (1920) (violation
of prohibition law). Fraud or corruption in various non-professional pe-
cuniary transactions is often sufficient. In 7e Isaacs, 172 App. Div. 181,
158 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dept. 1916) (fraudulent real estate scheme);
In 'e Crane, 189 Pac. 1072 (Calif. 1920) (using mails to defraud). Con-
tra: State v. Weber, 141 La. 448, 75 So. 111 (1917) (forgery). In view
of an attorney's relation of trust and confidence, the instant case, in making
conduct of an attorney outside of his profession grounds for disbarment,
should be approved.
BANKS AND BANKING-NOTICE OF ADVRSTE CLAIMS TO DEF0ST.-The
plaintiff sold a shipment of hogs. The vendee resold them and drew a
draft on his vendee which he deposited -with the defendant bank. The
draft was honored and the amount was credited to the first vendee's account.
In the meantime he had drawn a cheek on the defendant, to pay
the plaintiff. The defendant knew that the vendee was insolvent, and that
he bought livestock and paid for them out of the proceeds from their rerale.
Payment of the check was refused, the deposit having been practically ex-
hausted by the payment of other checks drawn by the vendee. The plain-
tiff sued for money had and received. From a judgment for the defendant,
plaintiff brought certiorari. Held, that the judgment of the lower court be
quashed, on the ground that the defendant had notice of the plaintiff's
interest in the deposit. State ex rcl. Roberts -e. Trimble, 289 S. W. 79G
(Mo. 1926).
A bank having "knowledge" of a third party's interest in a deposit is
not privileged to apply the deposit on a matured debt of the depositor to
the bank. Lewis v. McMahon & Co., 307 Mo. 552, 271 S. W. 779 (1925).
Otherwise, in the absence of such knowledge. Bellevue State Bank v. Haley
Nat'l Bank, 37 Idaho, 121, 215 Pac. 126 (1923) ; Thomas v. Farmer.s' Nat'l
Bank, 217 S. W. 860 (Mo. App. 1920). Some courts, however, hold that
even in the latter situation the bank is not protected unless it has changed
its "position" in reliance on the deposit. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hoaicr, 295
Fed. 611 (C.C.A. 5th, 1923). Contra: Inv 7 Goil, 8 Fed. (2d) 101 (S. D.
N. Y. 1925); of. (1925) 38 HARV. L. RE.V. 800 (suggesting grounds other
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than "change of position"). Reliance on expectations of future deposits
has been held sufficient. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Stockyards Loan Go., 16
Fed. (2d) 911 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926). Some courts distinguish between set-
off by the bank and payment of checks drawn to third parties, holding that
payment is privileged. Cable v. Iowa State Say. Bank, 197 Iowa, 393, 194
N. W. 957 (1924); cf. Scott, Participation in a Breach of Thst (1921) 34
HARV. L. REV. 454. This distinction may, perhaps, be justified where the
facts merely give notice of a general "fiduciary" relationship but do not
disclose the terms. In the instant case, the court found notice of general
relationship, and that the debt was to be paid from the deposit. It is
difficult to determine what facts constitute such notice. That the depositor
is a commission merchant or factor is regarded as material. Union Stock
Yards Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411, 11 Sup. Ct. 118 (1890). Likewise,
the financial status and the manner in which payments for sales are made.
Cf. Cable v. Iowa State Say. Bank, supra; Security Bank & Tnust Co. v.
Geren, 288 Fed. 317 (C.C.A. 5th, 1923). It would seem to be largely a
question of policy in determining at what point a bank should be deemed
on notice. The instant decision requires the utmost caution on the part
of paying banks.
BANKS AND BANKING-POWER OF STATE To REGUILATE NATIONAL BANKS.-
The Carnegie Trust Company, organized under state law, owned a largo
number of shares of stock in the First National Bank of Carnegie, or-
ganized under the national banking laws. Both failed. A state law pro-
vided that the depositors of an insolvent trust company should be given
preference over all other creditors. Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) § 6341. A
federal statute provided that each stockholder in a national bank should be
responsible for the par value of his stock in addition to the amount invested
in such stock. U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9689. The receiver of the na-
tional bank filed a claim under this statute against the Trust Company,
which was allowed but priority was refused. The receiver sued on the
ground that the state statute conflicted with the federal act, and was,
therefore, "void." From a decree dismissing -the complaint, the receiver
appealed. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the decree be affirmed. In ro
Cameron, 135 Atl. 295 (Pa. 1926).
State regulation of banks is ineffectual as to national banks if it con-
flicts with any act of Congress, or if it "impairs the efficiency of the bank."
First Nat'l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366, 43 Sup. Ct. 602
(1923) (escheat to state of bank deposits unclaimed for twenty years);
Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 23 Sup. Ct. 288 (1903) (prohibition against
acceptance of deposits when insolvent or failing); Davis v. Elmira Savings
Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 16 Sup. Ct. 502 (1896) (regulation of distribution of
assets of insolvent banks); but cf. State v. Clement Nat'l Bank, 84 Vt.
167, 78 Atl. 944 (1911). (tax on depositors in national banks); McClellan
v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347, 17 Sup. Ct. 85 (1896) (law setting aside con-
veyances made when insolvent held applicable where a national bank was
the transferee). The instant decision may be sustained on the ground that
the national law merely provides, in effect, that the receiver of a national
bank is a creditor of stockholders, while the state law recognizes the debts
of insolvent trust companies, but designates the order of payment.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PARTIAL INVALIDITY OF KANSAS INDUSTRIAL
COURT ACT.-The defendant was convicted for violating section 19
of the Industrial Court Act of Kansas (Kan. Laws, Spec. Sess., 1920, c. 29)
which makes it a felony for an officer of a labor union to use the influence
of his office to induce others to quit their employment. He appealed to the
United States Supreme Court on the ground that section 19 had necessarily
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fallen, because of the Wolff Packing Co. decision. The case was remanded
to the Supreme Court of Kansas which held that section 19 might stand
alone, and the defendant then brought a second writ of error on the
ground that the statute, as construed by the state Supreme Court, was un-
constitutional. Held, that the judgment be affirmed on the ground that
section 19 is constitutional when used to prevent "illegal" strikes. Dorchy
v. Kansas, 47 Sup. Ct. 86 (U. S. 1926).
In the absence of any express saving clause, a decision holding a portion
of an Act unconstitutional is taken to render the whole invalid where the
portions are deemed interdependent, i. e., part of the general scheme. Giboon
v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 101, 272 S. W. 43 (1925) (valid burglary pro-
vision connected with invalid robbery provision); State v,. Sansore, 133
Mliss. 428, 97 So. 753 (1923) (provision making desertion of wife a felony
held inseparable from invalid procedural sections). Otherwise, where the
sections are deemed independent or severable. State v. Fankin, 63 Utah,
442, 226 Pac. 674 (1924) (liquor nuisance injunction proceedings act was
valid although provision for jail sentence without jury trial was uncon-
stitutional); Baldwin v. State, 194 Ind. 303, 141 N. E. 343 (1923) (vehicle
operation provision not affected by invalidity of registration provision).
But where there is a saving clause, as in the Industrial Act, courts have
generally refrained, in subsequent cases, from passing on the constitution-
ality of the Act as a whole State Howatt, 116 Kan. 412, 227 Pac. 752
(1924) ; but see Springfield Gas Co. v. Sprindgfield, 292 Ill. 23 24, 120 N. E.
739,743 (1920). But where the legislation is chiefly a social-political experi-
ment, the holding of vital sections unconstitutional may greatly change the
effect of the whole Act. The sections of the Kansas Industrial Act giving the
court power to fix minimum wages have ben held unconstitutional. Charlc3
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 2G2 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct.
630 (1923). The Act aimed to limit the freedom of the employer and em-
ployee groups equally so that their comparative bargaining position would
remain unchanged while the welfare of the public was protected from in-
dustrial varfare. It seems, therefore, that the industrial court officials
were reasonable in viewing the Wolff Packing Co. case as a test of the
entire Act. See Third Ann. lep. Court of Industrial Relations (Kansas,
1922) 8; see dissenting opinion of Judge Burch in State v. Howatt, -Z.pra,
at 418, 227 Pac. at 755. The Supreme Court has frequently held itself
bound by the decisions of the highest state court as to the meaning of state
legislation. Dorchy v. State, 264 U. S. 286, 44 Sup. Ct. 323 (1924); Sn-
preine Lodge, K. P. v. Meyer, 265 U. S. 30, 44 Sup. Ct. 432 (1924). It
therefore did not pass upon the severability of the sections of the Act but
limited its decision to the constitutionality of section 19 as a separate
statute when applied to "illegal" strikes.
CORPORATIONS-FEDEA.AL JUISDICTIoN-DIERMsrY or CiTIZEsNSrP.-The
incorporators and shareholders of the plaintiff, a Tennessee corporation
authorized to carry on a taxicab business, had previously incorporated in
Kentucky. The Kentucky corporation had made a contract which gave
it the exclusive privilege of soliciting taxicab business at a railway depot.
The contract was enforceable in the federal, but not in the Kentucky, courts.
The Kentucky corporation was dissolved, and on the subsequent formation
of the plaintiff corporation, a similar contract was made. The plaintiff
was incorporated for the purpose of litigating in the federal courts any
disputes arising out of the contract. Plaintiff sued to enjoin interference
with the contract. Section 37 of the Judicial Code (U. S. Comp. Stat.
(1916) § 1019) provides for dismissal of suits where " . . . the
parties . . . have been improperly or collusively made or joined . . .
for the purpose of creating a case cognizable . . . " in the federal
courts. The lower court held that there was no collusion within this see-
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tion. Held, on appeal, that the judgment for the plaintiff be affirmed.
Black & White Taxi & T. Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi & T. Co., 15 Fed.
(2d) 509 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
A transfer of property for the purpose of creating diversity of citizen-
ship is held collusive under § 37 of the Judicial Code if the transferor can
compel a re-transfer. Miller & Lux Corp. v. East Side C. & I. Co., 211
U. S. 293, 29 Sup. Ct. 111 (1908). Similarly, where the shareholders of a
corporation formed a second corporation in another state without dis-
solving the original corporation, suit by the second corporation relating to
property transferred by the first corporation was held collusive. Lehigh
M. & Mf'g Go. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327, 16 Sup. Ct. 307 (1895). Likewise,
where an individual incorporated and transferred to the corporation. Mc-
Lean Oil Co. v. Ashworth's Heir's, 283 Fed. 422 (E. D. Tex. 1922). Cf.
Rojas-Adams Corp. of Del. v. Young, 13 Fed. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926).
These decisions were perhaps influenced largely by the fact that the parties
interested in the outcome of the controversy were substantially the same.
The instant case differs principally in that the first corporation was dis-
solved before incorporation of the plaintiff, and that a new contract was
entered into. While these facts alone might appear to be no sufficient
basis for a different rule, yet when they are considered in connection with
the further fact that the shareholders apparently intended to continue
business as a Tennessee Corporation, the distinction drawn seems more
tenable.
CORPORATIONS-RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENT CORPORATION ron TORT or
SUBSIDLRY.-The plaintiff sued the defendant railway for injuries due to
the negligence of a motorman on the line of a subsidiary. The defendant
owned substantially all of the shares of the subsidiary, but had not or-
ganized it. Each road had the same executive officers, and most of the
same directors. The defendant had made loans to the subsidiary for con-
struction and operation expenses, and held its second mortgage bonds. Em-
ployees of the subsidiary were paid out of its own bank account, but by the
defendant's paymaster. The cars leased from the defendant were used
solely on the subsidiary's line. Held, (two judges dissenting) for the de-
fendant. Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926).
The circumvention of fraud is the chief but not the only ground for dis-
regarding the shareholder's usual freedom from personal responsibility
for corporate acts. 3 CooK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 663. Thus
parent corporations have been held responsible for the torts of their sub-.
sidiaries, where there has been such domination as to justify the finding
of either an identity between them, or the relation of principal and agent.
Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1925)
14 CALIF. L. Rnv. 12, 15. This degree of control has been determined by
certain evidential facts of ownership and management. Lehigh Valley R. R.
v. Delachesa, 145 Fed. 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906) (ownership of all shares,
joint officers, separate accounts) ; Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Allis-Chal-
mers Co., 176 Fed. 362 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910) (ownership of majority of
shares, some common directors, subsidiary run as department of parent);
Foard Co. v. Maryland, 219 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) (joint officers,
parent paid losses and kept profits); St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Sanford,
54 Okla. 185, 153 Pac. 650 (1915) (ownership of all shares, joint train
crews, separate accounts); Specht V. Missouri Pao. R. R., 154 Minn. 314,
191 N. W. 905 (1923) (ownership of all shares, subsidiary formed by parent
to escape license fee, separate accounts); Davis v. Alexander, 269 U. S.
114, 46 Sup. Ct. 34 (1925). (single system, joint accounts, train crews and
rolling stock). The same facts have been examined where responsibility
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has been denied. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Cochran, 43 Kan. 225, 2.3
Pac. 151 (1890) (share control, some common officers); Stone -v. Cicreland,
G. C. & St. L. Ry., 202 N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 810 (1911) (ownership of ma-
jority of shares, minority of common directors, some common officerz, single
system, separate accounts); of. Friedman, v. Vandalid R. R, 251 Fed. 292
(C. C. A. 8th, 1918). From these cases it appears that no single objective
test of responsibility can be formulated. Ballantine, op. cit. ,vpia, at 18.
But it seems, as pointed out by the dissent, that most courts have held the
parent responsible where the facts of control were much less strong than
in the instant case.
EQuITY-REscIusION-LcK OF OFFER To RETURN BrNErrs.The plain-
tiff, through her husband, negotiated with the defendant for an exchange of
lands subject to the mortgages thereon. After possession bad been given
in each ease, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant had conveyed lezs
land than he had represented. The mortgage on the land received by the
plaintiff was foreclosed. Three years later the plaintiff sued to rezcind
the exchange contract. The lower court dismissed the suit. HldJ, on ap-
peal, that the decree be affirmed since the bill did not contain an offer to
make restitution. Farris v. Cavndr, 154 N. E. 111 (I1. 1926).
At law, a tender before trial of the benefits received is said to be necez-
sary to found an action for the return of the property transferred. Ebncr
v. Haverty Fur Co., 128 S. C. 151, 122 S. E. 578 (1924) ; but cf. S13oon,
Potter & Co. v. Hill, 18 R. I. 212, 26 Atl. 196 (1893) (not necezary in care
of "fraud"). This requirement is dispensed with in many situations.
Continental Ins. Co. v. Equitable Tr st Co., 127 Misc. 45, 215 N. Y. Supp.
281 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (consideration received worthless); Do, glas v. Scott,
130 App. Div. 322, 114 N. Y. Supp. 470 (3d Dept. 1909) (amount due
plaintiff apart from the contract). In equity, however, while tender before
trial is not necessary, it is said that an offer to restore must, at least,
be stated in the bill. Masters v. Van, Wart, 134 Atl. 539 (Me. 1926);
Diven v. Ashbaugh, 121 Misc. 213, 200 N. Y. Supp. 634 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
but of. Willianzs v. Fouche, 160 Ga. 801, 129 S. B. 49 (1925). This rule,
however, is not strictly followed. Page Belting Co. v. Pince, 77 N. H. 309,
91 Atl, 961 (1914) (damages to plaintiff greater than benefits received);
King v. Livingston Mf'g Co., 192 Ala. 269, 68 So. 897 (1915) (consideration
received worthless); Adamns v. Stringfellow, 107 So. 633 (Fla. 1920) (bill
for general relief held sufficient); cf. Wilks v. McGovern Place Oil Co., 207
N. W. 693 (Wis. 1926). The fact that a bill contains no offer to mahe
restitution should not bar recovery. Restitution may be assured by means
of a conditional decree. Picrce v. Garrett, 107 So. 885 (Miss. 1926). The
instant decision may have been influenced by the fact that the mortgage
had been foreclosed. Cf. Muellcr v,. Miohels, 184 Wis. 324, 199 N. W. 380
(1924); but cf. Henninger v. Heald, 52 N. J. Eq. 431, 29 Atl. 190 (1894);
Long v. Calloway, 220 S. W. 414 (Tex. 1920). It might be sustained on
the ground, not stressed in the opinion, that the plaintiff did not sue until
three years after discovery of the fraud. Cf. Trowbridge v. Ocn sen, 207
App. Div. 740, 202 N. Y. Supp. 833 (2d Dept. 1924); but cf. Wagg v.
Herbert, 215 U. S. 546, 30 Sup. Ct. 218 (1909) (defendant not injured by
delay of 25 months).
EVIDENCE--ADmSSIBILITY OF SIMILAR SEXUAL OFFENSES TO SHOW INTT
DIsPosiTIoN OR SYSTEli.-The defendant, a clergyman, was indicted for the
statutory crime of taking indecent liberties with a child under fifteen, with
intent to gratify sexual desire. The testimony of twelve other girls that the
defendant had taken similar liberties with them was admitted by the trial
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court to show the intent charged. Held, (three judges dissenting) that
this evidence should not have been admitted, since specific intent was not
an essential element of the crime charged. People v. Rogers, 154 N. E.
909 (Ill. 1926).
It is often said that the evidence of the commission of other crimes is
not admissible to prove that the defendant committed the offense charged.
See People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 293, 61 N. E. 286, 294 (1901). Such
evidence has been admissible, however, to show intent or guilty know-
ledge where these are essential elements of the crime charged. People v.
Hobbs, 297 Ill. 399, 130 N. E. 77.9 (1921) (abortion); State v. Routzahn,
81 Neb. 133, 115 N. W. 759 (1908) (blackmail); York v. United States,
241 Fed. 656 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916) (passing counterfeit money); Common-
wealth v. McGarvey, 158 Ky. 570, 165 S. W. 973 (1914) (receiving stolen
goods). But in sexual crimes, the courts hold that since intent or guilty
knowledge can be inferred from the nature of the act, evidence of similar
offenses with other persons is inadmissible to prove them. State V. Weaver,
182 Iowa, 921, 166 N. W. 379 (1918) (indecent liberties); State V. Wil-
liams, 36 Utah, 273, 103 Pac. 250 (1909) (statutory rape); State v. MeAl-
lister, 67 Or. 480, 136 Pac. 354 (1913) (sodomy); People v. Letoile, 31
Calif. App. 166, 159 Pac. 1057 (1916) (incest). They admit, however, simi-
lar sexual offenses with the same person, to show a lascivious disposition
in the accused toward the latter. Grabowski v. State, 126 Wis. 447, 105
N. W. 805 (1905) (indecent liberties); People v. Gray, 251 Il1. 431, 96
N. E. 268 (1911) (statutory rape); People v. Swift, 172 Mich. 473, 138
N. W. 662 (1912) (sodomy); State v. Pelser, 182 Iowa, 1, 163 N. W. 600
(1917) (incest). It would also seem relevant to show a lascivious dispo-
sition or abnormal nature in general, as evidenced by similar offenses with
other persons. In isolated cases this sort of evidence has been admitted
as proof of design or system. State v. Hammock, 18 Idaho, 424, 110 Pac.
169 (1910) (rape); Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243, 80 S. E. 1016 (1914)
(crime against nature); (1914) 27 HARv. L. REV. 762; see dissent in
State v. Start, 65 Or. 178, 195, 132 Pac. 512, 517 (1913) (sodomy). The
distinction between intent, disposition and system seems tenuous. But they
afford convenient grounds for the admission in the court's discretion of evi-
dence of similar offenses, which seems relevant because of similarity to the
crime charged.
EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS-NECESSITY OF REALIZATION OF 5i1-
PENDING DEATH.-In a prosecution for murder, the trial court admitted
in evidence as a dying declaration a statement made by the deceased, who
had been shot in the abdomen, to the attending surgeon, before being op-
erated upon for internal hemorrhage. The surgeon testified that he did
not know that the wound was fatal until after the operation, and that the
deceased made no expression that he thought death would take place.
Held, that the statement should not have been admitted, since it was not
shown to have been made with the realization that death was inevitable.
McKee v. State, 154 N. E. 372 (Ind. 1926).
The requirement that a dying declarant be conscious of impending death
is well settled. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1440. But every
trial court must determine and find what facts satisfy it. An expression of
despair by the deceased, the best and most common evidence of this con-
sciousness, has frequently been held sufficient. Noble v. Commonwealth,
212 Ky. 668, 279 S. W. 1073 (1925). But it is not necessary. People V.
Falletto, 202 N. Y. 494, 96 N. E. 355 (1911). Nor is it conclusive. Tibbs
v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558, 128 S. W. 871 (1910). All the circum-
stances surrounding the declaration should be considered. See Freels v.
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State, 130 Ark. 189, 198, 196 S. W. 913, 916 (1917). Expressions of despair
to the deceased by physicians or other attendants have often been held suf-
ficient. Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140, 13 Sup. Ct. 50 (1892).
But they are not necessary. People -e. Cord, 157 Calif. 562, 103 Pac. 511
(1910). Nor are expressions of hope by physicians conclusive the other
way. Wheeler v. State, 112 Ga. 43, 37 S. E. 126 (1900). A realization in
the declarant that death is inevitable has also been inferred from the na-
ture of his wounds. Territory v. Eagle, 15 N. I1. 609, 110 Pac. 362 (1910)
(similar wound as in instant case). The inference has likewise been drawn
from the conduct of the deceased, such as a request for religious consola-
tion. People v. Buettncr, 233 Ill. 272, 84 N. E. 213 (1908). Or farewells
to relatives. Jones v. State, 3 Ark. 579, 115 S. W. 166 (1909). Or ar-
rangement of worldly affairs. Commonwealth v,. De Leo, 242 Pa. 510, 89
Atl. 584 (1914). Or funeral directions. Whitehcad a,. Commonwealth, 200
Ky. 440, 255 S. W. 93 (1923). Thus it seems that -while the trial judge
must have some circumstantial basis for his ruling, there is no single ob-
jective test which he must apply. Hence it is undesirable to disturb his
finding on review. WIGMsORE, op. cit. supra, § 1442; see Williarac v. State,
168 Ind. 87, 91, 79 N. E. 1079, 1081 (1907).
INTERSTATE COIrBIERCE-STATE REGULATION OF INTE.STAE Tns,.,misso:z
AND SA oF EcrcrrY.-In 1917, a Rhode Island power company con-
tracted to sell to the defendant, a MIassachusetts corporation, electricity for
twenty years at a specified rate, delivery to be made at the state line. In
1924, the company filed with the plaintiff a new schedule for increased rates.
The defendant, which bought less than 3% of the electricity produced, Vas
in fact the only customer affected by this new schedule. The plaintiff found
that the contract rate discriminated against the company's other customers
(over 70,000 all in Rhode Island) and sanctioned the new schedule. The
schedule was held invalid by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island as im-
posing a direct burden on interstate commerce. The plaintiffs brought
certiorari. Held, (Justice Brandeis dissenting) that the decrea be af-
firmed. Public Utilities Commission of Rhodc Island v. Attlebo7o Steam
& Electric Co., 47 Sup. Ct. 294 (U. S. 1927).
It is generally said that a state may, in the absence of congressional
action, regulate subjects incidentally affecting interstate commerce, if re-
garded as essentially local in character; but no subject essentially national
in its character may be so regulated. Minnesota Rate Cases, 200 U. S.
352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913) ; Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pablic Scrvicc Comm.
of New York, 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279 (1920). The terms "essentially
local" and "essentially national" are variable concepts, difficult to define
or to apply to a concrete set of facts. Where the transmission of gas
or electricity is involved courts seem to apply the following test: If the
commodity is sold directly to the ultimate consumers within the state, the
state may regulate the rates to such consumers, although the commodity
be produced in and transmitted from another state, the matter being re-
garded as "essentially local." Pennsylvania Gas Co. v,. Pzblic Scrricc
Comm. of New York, supra; Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. i. Public Sc7vice
Comzm., 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557 (1919); Manufacturcrs' Light & Heat
Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 940 (N. D. W. Va. 1914). But if the commodity is sold
first to distributors in another state, apparently neither state may regu-
late the rates between producer and distributor, the transaction being con-
sidered "essentially national." Missouri v. Kansas Natral Gas Co., 265
U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544 (1924); Pennsylvania & Ohio v. West Vi7ginia,
262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1923). The instant decision illustrates a
literal application of this test. Cf. Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact
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Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments (1925) 34
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 685, 714. In the instant case it was found necessary
to regulate the rate on the 3% entering interstate commerce in order to
insure a reasonable return on the 97% locally consumed. Because of the
relatively small amount entering interstate commerce, the regulation might
well have been considered "essentially local," and the resulting burden on
interstate commerce "indirect."
JURISDICTION-SERVICE UPON FOREIGN CORPORATION-ACCRUAL OF CAUSE
OF ACTION OUTSIDE THE STATE.-The defendlant, a Missouri corporation,
took the plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, with others, by special pullman
from Kansas City to Texas, where she was fraudulently induced to pur-
chase land. Service was made on the corporation by delivery of the
summons to its president, while he was temporarily in Illinois on business
of the corporation. No other acts of business of the corporation in Illinois
were shown. The defendant's plea to the jurisdiction was overruled. Upon
trial on the merits, judgment was given for the plaintiff. Held, on writ
of error, that the judgment be reversed as the Illinois court had no juris-
diction since the corporation was not "doing business" there. James-Dick-
inson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 47 Sup. Ct. 308 (U. S. 1927).
Jurisdiction may be obtained over a foreign corporation, even in the ab-
sence of consent, if it has been "doing business" within the state. St. Clair
v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 1 Sup. Ct. 354 (1882). This has been justified on three
theories: (1) "implied consent," (2) "presence," and (3) "submission";
the first two of which are rather generally discredited. See Smolik v. Phil-
adelphia & Reading C. & L Co., 222 Fed. 148, 150 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).;
Fead, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24 Mian. L. REV. 633,
634; Scott, Business Jurisdiction over Non-residents (1919) 32 HARV.
L. REv. 871; Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-resident Motorists (1926)
39 HAnv. L. REV. 563, 572 et seq. It is difficult to state what facts
are necessary to constitute "doing business." Fead, op. cit. supra, at 638.
The Supreme Court has consistently refused to lay down a precise definition.
See St Louis Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U. S 218, 227, 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 247 (1913).
Generally, however, certain elements appear to be required: (1) Some
commercial transaction within the state. Riverside Mills v. Mcnefec, 237
U. S. 189, 35 Sup. Ct. 579 (1915). (2) Physical presence. Minnesota
Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140, 43 Sup. Ct. 293 (1923).
(3) Such presence must be relatively continuous. Rosenburg Bros. v. Cur-
tis-Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516, 43 Sup. Ct. 170 (1923). (4) This presence
must be by an agent who has a sufficient degree of authority to
bind the corporation. People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246
U. S. 79, 38 Sup. Ct. 233 (1918) ; but cf. Haskell v. Aluminum Co., 14 Fed.
(2d) 864 (D. Mass. 1926). But these are not rigid requirements, and ex-
trinsic factors seem to influence the strictness of the interpretation. Thus,
the volume of the corporation's transactions with residents of the state.
Cf. Commercial Mutual Ace. Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 29 Sup. Ct. 445
(1909) ; Haskell v. Aluminum Co., supra (jurisdiction where large). And
the ease and relative fairness with which suit might have been brought in
another state. Cf, Davis v. Farmer's Co-op. Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup.
Ct. 556 (1923) (jurisdiction denied).; Shambe v. Delaware & H. R. R., 135
Atl. 755 (Pa. 1927). The accrual of the cause of action without the state
would seem to be another such factor. It has been contended that service
on an agent of the corporation in such case should be invalid in the absence
of express consent. See Fead, op. cit. supra, at 644-647; of. Barry, Juris-
diction over Non-Residents (1927) 13 VA. L. REV. 175, 193. This conten-
tion is based on a decision involving service on a state official in a similar
situation. Cf. Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255
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(1915). The instant decision, however, which presents such facts, was
placed on the ground that the corporation was not "doing business" within
the state. Thus, the question as to the effect of the accrual of the cause of
action -without the state was left open. It might well be that while a
stricter interpretation of the concept "doing business" may be entailed, a
valid service is not automatically barred in this situation.
LiBE,--AmiiGuous STATEMENTS-QuEsTION WHETIER Won Ds R = To
PLAINTF.-The defendant sent the plaintiff a notice by a form letter that it
was about to sue her for a two dollar debt. The notice also stated that the
laws of the state provided that persons guilty of obtaining goods under
false pretenses should be punished by fine or imprisonment. In a suit for
libel, the court sustained the defendant's demurrer. Held, on appeal, (one
judge dissenting) that the judgment be reversed, as the words, if they re-
ferred to the plaintiff, accused her of a crime, and whether they did so refer
was for the jury. Williamson v. Askin & Marine Co., 136 S. E. 21 (S. C.
1926).
Whether or not a statement can be libelous is a question for the court.
Flaks v. Clark, 143 Md. 377, 122 Atl. 383 (1923) ; Du, Pont & Co. v. Nash-
vaille Banner Publishing Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926). But
when the words are capable of more than one meaning, it is for the jury to
decide whether they were used in a libelous sense. First Nat'l Bank r.
Winters, 225 N. Y. 47, 121 N. E. 459 (1918); York v. Cole, 203 N. W. 944
(Wis. 1926); Baker v. Warner, 231 U. S. 5S8, 34 Sup. Ct. 175 (1913).
Likewise whether the statement referred to the plaintiff. The motive of
the publisher is immaterial. Jones v. Hulton & Co. [1909] 2 K. B. 414;
Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 Fed. (2d) 207 (App. D. C. 1925). Con-
tra: Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293, 04 N. E. 462 (1S93).
Thus, the case is submitted to the jury although the plaintiff is not directly
named in the publication, if persons might reasonably understand it to re-
fer to him. Latimer v. Western Morning News Co., 25 L. T. (N. S.) 44
(1871) ; Martin County Bank v. Day, 73 Minn. 195, 75 N. W. 1115 (1893).
Likewise, where a limited class or body are defamed and the plaintiff, con-
nected with the statement, is one of the class. Scymo2ur -e. Butterzeorth,
3 F. & F. 372 (Q. B. 1862); Joynt v. Cycle Trade Publishing Co. [1901]
2 K. B. 292. Accordingly, as the court found the words to be libelous in
character, the demurrer appears to have been properly overruled.
PLEADING-SPLITTING CAUSES oF AcroN -C--ouNTmrscLhx INr Co=,r oF
LIMITED JURISDICTIN.-The plaintiff, having successfully interposed the de-
fendant's malpractice as a defense to an action for medical fees in a justice's
court, brought an action for damages against the defendant because of that
malpractice. Judgment was given for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that
the judgment be affirmed, since one may not split his cause of action. Les-
lie v. Mollica, 211 N. W. 267 (Mich. 1926).
Statutes limiting the amount of claims triable in a justice's court are
generally interpreted as applying to counterclaims as well as to the plain-
tiff's claim. Martin v. Eastman, 109 Wis. 2S6, 85 N. W. 359 (1901) ; Dur-
esen v. Blackmarr, 117 Minn. 206, 135 N. W. 530 (1912); see Stephan v.
Superior Court, 183 Calif. 673, 674, 192 Pac. 1083 (1920). But in New
York such a statutory limitation upon the jurisdiction of county courts is
held to apply only to the plaintiff's claim and jurisdiction is retained for the
settlement of all counterclaims. Howard Iron Works v. Buffalo Elcrating
Co., 176 N. Y. 1, 68 N. E. 66 (1903) ; cf. Rohssler v. Rohsslcr, 120 Misc. 569,
199 N. Y. Supp. 830 (Sup. Ct. 1923). Contrary to the instant case it is ord-
inarily held, however, that where one has been compelled to confine his use
of a counterclaim to defeating the plaintiff's action, he may later main-
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tain an action for the part not so used. Gordon v. Van Coot, 38 App. Div.
564, 56 N. Y. Supp. 554 (2d Dept. 1899); Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Rosen.
stein, 122 Wash. 301, 210 Pac. 677 (1922); of. Tiibby v. O'Neal, 39 App.
D. C. 467 (1912) (special action under statute to recover possession of
chattel no bar to later action for damages where statute made no provision
for such damages in first action). By statute in Michigan the defendant's
affirmative recovery by way of counterclaim in a justice's court is limited
to $300. Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) § 14228. Some statutes provide for
the removal of the case to a court having jurisdiction upon the filing of a
counterclaim the whole of which is not within the jurisdiction of the jus-
tice's court. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5676 (upon furnishing of bond
by defendant); Gullett v. Blanton, 157 Ky. 457, 163 S. W. 465 (1914)
(upon motion of one of the parties). While the rule against splitting
should apply where there are these latter statutes, or where the whole
counterclaim is within the jurisdiction of the court, it should not apply
where recovery on the counterclaim is limited. Cf. CLEVENGER, N. Y.
PRACTICE MANUAL, JUSTICE COURT PRACTICE (1926) § 264 (jurisdiction
over counterclaim limited but balance recoverable in later action).
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-POWER OF CASHIER TO BIND BANK ON IREPRESEN-
TATIONS-Since the deposits of the defendant bank were "running low,"
the cashier induced the plaintiff to buy one-half of a $2,000 note held by
the bank. At the cashier's suggestion, the maker gave the plaintiff his $1,000
note, and this sum was credited on the $2,000 note. The cashier made oral
representations as to the maker's credit, and orally promised to take up the
note at maturity if then unpaid. On the maker's default, the plaintiff
sued alleging fraudulent representations. The lower court directed a ver-
dict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judgment
be affirmed on the ground that the cashier had no authority to bind the
bank by such representations. Williams v. Ravania Bank, 289 S. W. 34
(Mo. App. 1926).
A bank is not bound by its cashier's guarantee of paper, where it has no
interest in the transaction. Quarries Co. v. Trust Co., 190 N. C. 277, 129
S. E. 619 (1925). But where the paper is sold by the bank, its power to
guarantee is recognized. Trust Co. v. Bank & Trust Co., 188 N. C. 766, 125
S. E. 536 (1924) ; cf. State Bank v. Delaney, 209 N. W. 311 (Minn. 1926).
In such circumstances the cashier is said to have implied authority to act
on behalf of the bank. Trust Co. v. Bank & Trust Co., supra; see Third
Nat'l Bank of St. Louis v. St. Charles Say. Bank, 244 Mo. 554, 580, 149
S. W. 495, 501 (1912). A bank may also be held responsible for represen-
tations made in the sale of its paper. Binghampton Trust Co. v. Autcn, 68
Ark. 299, 57 S. W. 1105 (1900) (representations by president); of. Young 'V.
Goetting, 16 Fed. (2d) 248 (C.C.A. 5th, 1926) ; Martin v. Bank, 126 Misc. 7,
211 N. Y. Supp. 828 (Sup. Ct. 1925). In Missouri, by statute, no suit can be
maintained on oral representations as to the credit of another. Mo. Rev.
Stat. (1919) § 2172. But such statutes have been held not to apply where
the representations were made by a creditor to enable him to dispose of
notes held by him. Ruddy v. Gunby, 180 S. W. 1043 (Mo. App. 1915);
Burleson v. Blair, 207 Mich. 222, 174 N. W. 167 (1919). In the instant
case, since the bank received a substantial benefit, it should have been bound
by the representation. The transaction might also have been regarded as
an agreement to repurchase. Such agreements have been held binding.
Central State Bank of Dallas v. First State Bank of Abilene, 276 S. W.
941 (Tex. 1925) (written agreement by cashier).
PROCEDURE-REAL PARTY IN INTEREST-RIGHT OF MORTGAGE TRUSTEE TO
FILE CLAIMS FOR BONDHOLDERS.-The plaintiff, who was trustee under a
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mortgage securing a corporate bond issue, filed a claim in receivership pro-
ceedings for the principal amount due on the bonds outstanding. Mo1any of
the individual bondholders also submitted claims. The plaintiff .,ntended,
and the lower court found, that it was the settled practice in dX Second
Federal Circuit to allow trustees to prove such claims. An order was is-
sued allowing the plaintiff's claim to the extent of the amount not covered
by the individual claims. Held, on appeal, that the order be rcverzed since
the plaintiff was not a creditor of the corporation, and could sue only in
reference to the mortgage security. Fitkin v. Ccztvzry Oil Co., 16 Fed.
(2d) 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
The instant ease adopted the view generally followed by the courts. In
Te United States Leatheroid & Rubbcr Co., 285 Fed. 884 (D. Mass. 1923);
United States Trust Co. v. Gordon, 216 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 0th, 1914).
Similarly, it has been held that a trustee is not entitled to a deficiency decree
in a suit for foreclosure of the mortgaged property. B;'zat Indt j nd cat
Mining Co. v. Palmer, 262 Fed. 370 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919); Macl ay v. Ran-
dolph Macon Coal Co., 178 Fed. 831 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910). And it seems
doubtful whether an e-xpress provision in a trust deed would give the
trustee a right of action on the bonds. See Mackay r. Rcsulolph Mtco Coal
Co., supra, at 834; In re Ellis, ITzc., 242 Fed. 156, 153 (D. N. J. 1917);
but cf. Lane v. Equitable Trust Co., 262 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. Sth, 1919)
(allowing trustee deficiency judgment). In these cases the ever prezent
problem of "the real party in interest" is sharply presented. Cf. Clark
and Hutchins, The Real Party in Intcrcst (1925) 34 YuXn LIw JoU r ;,%,
259. Denying a right of action to the trustee is the result of a trictly
technical interpretation on the meaning of "real party in intere't" and
overlooks the practical desirability of merging the interests of scattered
bondholders in one party, and of protecting the claims of -mall bondholders
who could not afford to press individual claims. Cf. Grant v. Win uv &
S. W. Ry., 85 Minn. 422, 430, 89 N. W. 60, 63 (1902) ; Baltiore v. United
Rys. & Electric Go., 108 Md. 64, 69, 69 Atl. 436, 438 (1903). In the in-
stant case the trustee could well be considered a real party in interest in
view of his general fiduciary duty to safeguard the interests of the cestuis.
The order of the lower court might be qualified by placing a limitation on
the time that the trustee should hold the undivided surplus if there were
unlocated bondholders, but otherwise the result attained in the lower court
seems more desirable.
TAx.ATwN-IN nnrr. NCE TAx-JOINT TEnANxcY.-In 1915, a joint tenancy
of real and personal property situated in California was created by will.
In 1918, one joint tenant died. An inheritance tax was assessed on one-half
the value of the joint tenancy under the Estate Tax Act, 39 Stat. 777, §§ 201,
202 (1916), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 6336U, b, c. The plaintiff, as ad-
ministratrix, paid the tax under protest and sued to recover it. Judgment
was rendered for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be af-
firmed on the ground that under the California law there was "no
change of title and no transfer by reason of the death." Cartcr v. English,
15 Fed. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
Under section 202 (c) of the Estate Tax Act (which expressly provides
for taxation of joint tenancies) no tax could be imposed in the instant case
for this section has been held not to be retroactive. Slaab r,. Doyle, 253
U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 391 (1922). Under section 201, however, any inter-
est transferred at death is taxable. Kissam v. M'Elligott, 280 Fed. 212
(S. D. N. Y. 1920). In general, it is said that the interest "transferred" is
to be determined by the law of the situs. Wardwell v. Blum, 276 Fed. 226
(C. C. A. 9th, 1921). Some courts have taxed that interest which the
decedent could have transferred during life, on the ground that this in-
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terest is "transferred" to the survivor by reason of the death of the other
joint tenant. Kissam v. M'Elligott, supra; cf. Walker v. Grogan, 283 Fed.
530(S.-D. Mich. 1922). Under the former general inheritance tax statute
of California it was held that no taxable interest passed to the survivor
on the death of one joint tenant. In re Gurnsey Estate, 177 Calif. 211, 170
Pac. 402 (1918). But the present statute expressly recognizes that where
the tenants are donees the "right of the surviving joint tenant to the im-
mediate ownership or possession and enjoyment" of the property upon the
death of one joint tenant is a "transfer" taxable as a devise of the whole
estate. Calif. Codes & Gen. Laws (Deering, 1917) Act 4035c, § 2 (5); of.
PINKERTON AND MILLSAPS, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAxES (1926). § 192
(4), 203. In tax cases involving community property, prior to this statute,
the half which passed to the wife at the death of the husband was taxable.
In re Mofitt's Estate, 153 Calif. 359, 95 Pac. 653 (1908). Under the statute
it is provided that the transfer to the wife shall be deemed for a valuable
consideration and there not taxable. Calif. Codes & Gen. Laws (Deering,
1917) Act 4035 c, § 1 (2). This was held to change accordingly, the fed-
eral estate tax on community property in California. Blum v. Wardwcll,
270 Fed. 309 (S. D. Calif. 1920). But cf. dissent in Wardwell v. Blum,
supra. It might well be argued that the federal tax on transfers involving
joint tenancies was likewise changed by the joint tenancy provision of the
later California statute.
TORTS-JOINT TORT FEASORS-IIPOSSIBILITY OF ASCERTAINING W1i1u
CAUSED INJuRY.-While hunting together, A and B fired across a high-
way simultaneously. A piece of shot struck the plaintiff's son. The plain-
tiff sued both A and B for damages. The trial court directed the plaintiff
to elect one as defendant. Plaintiff elected to sue A, and from a judgment
for the plaintiff, A appealed, claiming, inter alia, an absence of proof that
he was the one who caused the injury. Held, that judgment be affirmed
on the ground that A and B were joint tort feasors, either of whom is re-
sponsible for the entire injury. Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666 (Miss. 1927).
Various attempts have been made to classify joint tort feasor cases.
See (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 335. Parties are held to be joint tort
feasors when they act in concert. Hill v. American Stores Co., 80 Pa.
Super. Ct. 338 (1922); cf. Miller v. Beck, 108 Iowa, 575, 79 N. W. 344
(1899) (mere fact of simultaneous acts held not to establish relationship).
Although one party alone has caused the harm, the other is made respons-
ible as principal where he has instigated or encouraged his companion.
Daingerfield v. Thompson, 74 Va. 136 (1880); Harnahan v. Cochran, 12
App. Div. 91, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1031 (4th Dept. 1896). Again, it has been
required that independent tort feasors must each contribute in causing the
injury. Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220 Pac. 782 (1923). The facts
of the instant case do not come within any of the above "tests." There was
no action in concert, nor did either instigate the other's act, and the injury
could have been caused by only one of the parties. Nevertheless, the court
assumed the joint tort feasor relationship. More frankly, perhaps, the
term joint tort feasor is applied wherever the court has determined that
either of two defendants should be made responsible for the entire injury.
Courts, however, hesitate to apply it where damages for the harm done by
each defendant are severable. Cf. Mitchell Realty Co. v. City of West
Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N. W. 390 (1924); see (1910) 23 HARV. L. REV.
406. The decision in the instant case may have been influenced by the fact
that both defendants were engaged in criminal conduct. Cf. liss. Ann.
Code (Hemingway, 1917) § 956 (making it a crime to fire across highway).
The instant holding, although desirable, may possibly not be followed by
other courts because it extends responsibility beyond previous decisions.
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This illustrates the value of the more modern code provisions which permit
the plaintiff to sue the defendants jointly or in the alternative, thus
allowing the jury, rather than requiring the plaintiff, to determine which
party should be held responsible. See (1924) 33 YALE Lw JouEaL, 328;
Clark, Complaint in Code Pleading (1926) 35 YALE LAW JoVnNAL, 259, 278.
WILLS-CONDITIONAL AND CONTINGENT WiLs.-The testatrix made a will
reading in part as follows: "Last will of Kate F. Morton. I am going
on a journey and I may never come back alive, so I mahe this will; but I
expect to make changes if I live. First, I want a hospital built . . . if
I live I expect to have it done myself." The testatrix returned from the
journey and died ten months after the execution of the will. The plain-
tiffs, two brothers of the testatrx, contested the will on the ground that it
was conditional. The trial court admitted the will to probate as uncondi-
tional. Held, on appeal, (one judge dissenting) that judgment be reverned.
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 288 S. W. 833 (Ten. 1926).
If the occurrence of the contingency mentioned in the will is the reason,
cause, inducement, or occasion for making the will, it is regarded as "un-
conditional." Eaton v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411, 24 Sup. Ct. 487 (1904). But
if the will is intended to take effect in ease the event happens, it is deemed
"conditional." In re Poonarian's Will, 234 N. Y. 329, 137 N. E. 6OG (1922) ;
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 851; (1923) 23 COL. L. RE%. 403. The
difficulty lies in ascertaining the testator's intent from the instrument.
Hence courts usually indulge all presumption against the will being con-
ditional. Cf. Eaton v. Brown, supra; Likeeield v. Liefield, 82 Ky. 5S9
(1885); In T'e Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. 331, 6 Atl. 92 (1907). Some
courts, however, construe such wills as contingent. In rc Poonaisan's Will,
supra; Davis v. DaviR, 107 Miss. 245, 65 So. 241 (1914); Wall:cr v,. Hib-
bard, 185 Ky. 795, 215 S. W. 800 (1919); Phelps 'v. Ashton, 30 Tex. 344
(1867); In re Bittner, 104 Misc. 112, 171 N. Y. Supp. 366 (Surr. 1918).
There is no pragmatic test or formula for automatically determining
whether or not a condition was intended; it is purely a matter of construe-
tion and interpretation. There appears to be no exact precedent for the
instant case. In the two cases where the facts were most similar to those
in the instant case, the wills were held to be unconditional. Eaton v.
Brown, svpra ("I am going on a journey and I may not ever return.
And if I do not, this is my last bequest"); Kellehcr v,. Kcrnzan, CO Md. 440
(1883) (testator in anticipation of a trip disposed of property, reserving
its use to himself and the "right to dispose of same otherwise, if I deem
proper"). The fact that a new will is not made after the event named
fails to happen, should strongly influence holding the will to be uncondi-
tional since it is deceased's last testamentary declaration. That a testator
may make changes if he lives is an implied condition in every will, wills
being ambulatory, and the mere fact that it is expressed should not defeat
its operation, particularly since no subsequent changes were made. Hence
the instant decision seems unfortunate.
